Dense Urban

Written information used includes thousands of pages of hard-copy and electronic material, much of it from military personnel still serving in theater at the time of its writing. Interviews include those with members of the American, British, and Australian armed forces and civilians working to reconstruct Iraq. The military personnel represent all of the services and both regular and special operations organizations. The time frame for the study corresponds to two collection phases. Phase I was conducted from October 2003 to April 2004, while Phase II was conducted during three months, from July 2004 to September 2004. The results of a third phase of the study are published separately.

The eruption of violence threatened to draw U.S. forces into a battle in a closely packed urban area inhabited by an estimated 2.4 million people, many of whom strongly supported the GoI's main antagonist, Moqtada al-Sadr. U.S. casualties and collateral damage could have been substantial. Instead, through innovative tactics combining high-technology airborne surveillance and strike, elements of siege warfare and vigorous exploitation through civil military operations, coalition forces managed to subdue the uprising with minimum loss to U.S. forces and the civilian population. Success in this battle solidified Iraqi government control over all of Baghdad and throughout Iraq, creating conditions that enabled the United States to realize contemporary operational objectives in Iraq. The authors present the first full operational analysis of the battle and distill insights and lessons that can inform a broader understanding of urban operations, particularly those conducted as part of irregular warfare. This new paradigm can help the Army focus on what capabilities it will need in the future for such operations.

The US Army must think and learn through leveraging partnerships, which enhance institutional understanding. Historical experiences and lessons learned should assist in refining concepts and capabilities needed for the megacity. Continued leadership of an integrated joint scenario driven effort will inform future force organization and employment, and by utilizing a framework of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), the US Army should prepare itself for the megacity challenge. The US Army paradigm of Think—Learn— Analyze—Implement paradigm should also aid in the preparation.

America's armed forces are likely to have to confront the hell of urban combat. They have the potential to do so successfully. However, this environment's challenging character is unalterable; it will consume any force that fights unprepared. This study, based on an in-depth literature search and scores of interviews, has three primary objectives: (1) Describe the conditions confronting a ground force fighting under the constraints of minimizing noncombatant casualties and collateral damage, along with the difficulties of fighting under such conditions in urban areas; (2) Identify U.S. armed forces' current capabilities and ongoing efforts to enhance them; and (3) Determine current shortfalls and present potential remedies for identified vulnerabilities. Consideration of such solutions will include analysis of feasible changes in doctrine, training, and technologies that would give regular U.S. forces the capability to successfully perform constrained urban operations.

It is not hard to find tech evangelists touting that ubiquitous and highly interconnected digital technology will bring great advances in productivity and efficiency, as well as new capabilities we cannot foresee. This paper attempts to reveal what is possible when these technologies are applied to critical infrastructure applications en masse without adequate security in densely populated cities of the near future that are less resilient than other environments. Megacities need and will deploy these new technologies to keep up with insatiable demand for energy, communications, transportation, and other services, but it is important to recognize that they are also made more vulnerable by following this path. To illustrate what these eventualities could look like, we have constructed four scenarios for the not-too-distant future (2025) that lay out some of the more extreme risks we may face in an all-digital world.

This document is a first effort to explore the megacity challenge. The strategic significance of these places is explored, as well as the gap in both the Army’s and, more broadly, the Joint Community’s understanding of them. An approach for strategically appreciating megacities is offered, and case study vignettes from cities across the globe illustrate unique challenges posed by megacities. Finally, a series of first-order questions about the way forward are posed to provoke thought about how the Army might lead the effort to address the challenges posed by megacities.

In particular the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) is interested in these megacity networks and their implications for potential urban operations. We develop a methodology to group like megacities into five clusters. With 33 variables describing the four pillars, we construct a data set using over 90 data sources for 41 large urban areas. This work greatly expands previous work in both the number of cities studied and the number of variables used. We also study clustering sensitivity to missing values by generating an ensemble of 5,000 clusterings based on randomly imputed missing values. We compare these to clustering without imputation, the ensemble consensus or average clustering, and clusterings from previous studies in addition to identifying which cities are sensitive to missing values. Our work not only informs JWAC of the similarities and differences between the 41 cities studied, it provides a method to identify for which cities, more data collection is warranted, and it provides a blueprint for future work in this area.

Topics included the relationship between urbanization and revolutions in military affairs; the challenges of urban combat, based on personal experiences during the fighting in 1968 Hue, Republic of Vietnam; lessons learned from a 2001 operational and strategic-level war game; the development of theoretical constructs and decisionmaking aids for urban operations; a consideration of the operational-level challenges of coordinating urban internal security operations; the combat stress reaction that confronts individuals in the conduct of urban operations; the intricate and complex activities involved in maintaining peace and establishing stability in Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and the training essential to success in environments where much is demanded of the most junior-level leaders.

Defined as massive urban areas with over ten million residents, and conditions of instability, proponents of megacities believe they will present a fundamentally new challenge in the future, for which the Army is unprepared. In contrast, a smaller group of experts refutes this assessment, arguing that megacities are similar in nature to other urban areas, and forces fighting in them can use methods similar to those employed in smaller cities. Regardless of the exact outcome of this debate, one can reasonably expect megacities to present a key challenge to combat forces in the future—one that all urban areas have historically created—the challenge of conducting reconnaissance to gain understanding of the operating environment. FM 3-06, Urban Operations, defines five considerations for conducting urban ISR: early deployment, diversity, integration, flexibility, and focus. By examining case studies of urban ISR in Grozny, Fallujah, and Sadr City, this monograph proves that lessons from ISR efforts in smaller scale urban operations will directly apply to urban ISR in megacities.

Though RAF are not the primary solution to understanding megacities, they do represent the mindset of human engagement that will be required to discern the relationships between key actors in the environment. Gaps in professional knowledge of megacity environments could be addressed through officer education and fellowship programs, while tactical issues and technological development can be resolved in existing or accessible training sites. The method used is controlled comparison of three different developing megacity environments: Lagos, Karachi, and Cairo. These three environments readily demonstrate the complexity, scale, and depth of megacity environments and the challenges inherent in addressing them with RAF.

The authors of the chapters examine the ongoing doctrinal thinking, draw historical comparisons, and discuss the thoughts of those attending the conference—experts from the military, government civilian agencies, academia, think tanks, and the defense industry—regarding unconventional warfare. Collectively, they provide a comprehensive report on critical factors that the U.S. military soon may face.

This study proposes a new planning approach that employs identification of critical points — the essential elements of the urban area’s physical and demographic terrain — along with the notion of density — the quantity of elements and activities within the urban space — to aid military personnel in their efforts to overcome the complexity. Integrating this approach with the traditional command estimate process should assist the planner in determining how best to allocate a command's ever-scarce resources.

Urbanization is one of the most important mega-trends of the 21st century. Consequently, the possibility of U.S. military involvement in a megacity or sub-megacity is an eventuality that cannot be ignored. After elucidating the nature of urbanization and developing a typology in terms of smart, fragile, and feral cities, we give consideration to the kinds of contingencies that the U.S. military, especially the Army, needs to think about and prepare for. Understanding the city as a complex system or organism is critical and provides the basis for changes in intelligence, recruitment, training, equipment, operations, and tactics.

This document is a first effort to explore the megacity challenge. The strategic significance of these places is explored, as well as the gap in both the Army’s and, more broadly, the Joint Community’s understanding of them. An approach for strategically appreciating megacities is offered, and case study vignettes from cities across the globe illustrate unique challenges posed by megacities. Finally, a series of first-order questions about the way forward are posed to provoke thought about how the Army might lead the effort to address the challenges posed by megacities.

Defined as massive urban areas with over ten million residents, and conditions of instability, proponents of megacities believe they will present a fundamentally new challenge in the future, for which the Army is unprepared. In contrast, a smaller group of experts refutes this assessment, arguing that megacities are similar in nature to other urban areas, and forces fighting in them can use methods similar to those employed in smaller cities. Regardless of the exact outcome of this debate, one can reasonably expect megacities to present a key challenge to combat forces in the future—one that all urban areas have historically created—the challenge of conducting reconnaissance to gain understanding of the operating environment. FM 3-06, Urban Operations, defines five considerations for conducting urban ISR: early deployment, diversity, integration, flexibility, and focus. By examining case studies of urban ISR in Grozny, Fallujah, and Sadr City, this monograph proves that lessons from ISR efforts in smaller scale urban operations will directly apply to urban ISR in megacities.

In particular the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) is interested in these megacity networks and their implications for potential urban operations. We develop a methodology to group like megacities into five clusters. With 33 variables describing the four pillars, we construct a data set using over 90 data sources for 41 large urban areas. This work greatly expands previous work in both the number of cities studied and the number of variables used. We also study clustering sensitivity to missing values by generating an ensemble of 5,000 clusterings based on randomly imputed missing values. We compare these to clustering without imputation, the ensemble consensus or average clustering, and clusterings from previous studies in addition to identifying which cities are sensitive to missing values. Our work not only informs JWAC of the similarities and differences between the 41 cities studied, it provides a method to identify for which cities, more data collection is warranted, and it provides a blueprint for future work in this area.

The US Army must think and learn through leveraging partnerships, which enhance institutional understanding. Historical experiences and lessons learned should assist in refining concepts and capabilities needed for the megacity. Continued leadership of an integrated joint scenario driven effort will inform future force organization and employment, and by utilizing a framework of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), the US Army should prepare itself for the megacity challenge. The US Army paradigm of Think—Learn— Analyze—Implement paradigm should also aid in the preparation.

Before commanders can approve a concept of operations, direct proper planning and preparation of a battle or campaign, provide guidance for future branches and sequels, or set in place the right intelligence, command and control, or logistics networks, they must be able to visualize the operation at hand. The degree to which a plan and its execution are successful is often related to the quality
of the commander’s ability to visualize.