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New Reports from Military Periscope:
Rebuilding The Russian Air Force by Reuben F. Johnson | 07/29/2019
Description: Military modernization can be a difficult task under the best of circumstances. Numerous issues must be balanced, including capability, cost and industrial workshare. The Russian air force has been gradually upgrading its inventory with the latest models based on previous airframes. Earlier this year, it was revealed that Moscow would only buy a few examples of its latest Su-57 fighters, suggesting that air force would continue to rely on the latest versions of the MiG-29 and Su-27 platforms. This has since shifted, with potentially significant ramifications for the air force and industry.
New Fighters For The Front Line - Russian aggression in its near abroad has countries along its western border boosting their defense spending and taking steps to renew their military capabilities. New fighter jet programs are among the largest upcoming projects in places like Finland and Poland, where aging fleets are in need of replacement.
Restoring the European Security Order
"Both Russia and the West agree that business as usual is no longer possible in their relations. However, they have not articulated what kind of new relationship they anticipate for the future. Both have fallen back into mutual deterrence postures, apparently seeing the risks inherent in such policies as acceptable against the background of rising political stakes. So far, communication is largely limited to mitigating the risks of dangerous military incidents, with little scope for discussing broader issues of European security. Given the disagreement on how to move forward, official discussions have stalled and cooperative options for repairing the European security order are not given due consideration. This paper attempts to fill this gap by going beyond the current mainstream discourses and identifying ways forward, with the goal of laying the groundwork for the moment when official dialogue resumes. Well aware of the variety of issues on the agenda, we concentrate on three questions which we believe are of crucial importance for any future discussions: (1) whether and how diverging Russian and Western views on the European security order can be reconciled; (2) what should be done to prevent a new arms race in Europe; and (3) what could be done to appropriately address concerns of non-aligned states."
Publisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)
Date: 2019-03
Series: Key Challenges in U.S.-Russian Relations
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues [January 8, 2019]
"Members of Congress and Pentagon officials have placed a growing emphasis on U.S. programs to develop hypersonic weapons as a part of an effort to acquire the capability for the United States to launch attacks against targets around the world in under an hour. Hypersonic weapons can travel faster than Mach 5, or about 1 mile to 5 miles per second. This interest is driven by both the perceived mission need for conventional prompt strike systems and concerns about falling behind Russia and China in the development of these technologies. The United States is pursuing two key technologies for this purpose: boost-glide systems that place a hypersonic glider atop a ballistic missile booster or shorter-range rocket systems, and hypersonic cruise missiles that would use scramjet technologies. This report focuses, primarily, on the Pentagon's ongoing program to develop ballistic missilebased conventional prompt strike systems. This effort has been underway for about 15 years. The George W. Bush Administration demonstrated an interest in the use of conventional weapons for precision, long-range strike missions in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This study called for the integration of precision conventional weapons with strategic nuclear forces in a new category of 'offensive strike' weapons. Several other Pentagon studies published during the Bush Administration also called on the United States to develop the capability to attack targets around the world, in under an hour, with conventional warheads."
Date: 2019-01-08
URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=820227
Putin Exodus: The New Russian Brain Drain
"Human capital is fleeing Russia. Since President Vladimir Putin's ascent to the presidency, between 1.6 and 2 million Russians--out of a total population of 145 million--have left for Western democracies and some new destinations where they can be freer with their skills put to a better use. This emigration sped up with Putin's return as president in 2012, followed by a weakening economy and growing repressions. It soon began to look like a politically driven brain drain, causing increasing concern among Russian and international observers. In this report, the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center offers a comprehensive analysis of what we are calling the Putin Exodus and its implications for Russia and the West. It is supported by a pioneering sociological study of new Russian émigrés now living in four key locations in the United States and Europe, through a 100-question survey and a series of focus groups."
Publisher: Atlantic Council of the United States
Date: 2019-02
URL: http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/putin-exodus/The-Putin-Exodus.pdf
Understanding and Combating Russian and Chinese Influence Operations
"To develop best approaches to these troubling trends, the United States must first understand the challenges posed by China and Russia, including each regime's motivations and playbooks, as they seek to exert their influence around the world. China sees itself as the United States' peer competitor and wants to tilt the playing field further in its favor, which has led it to deploy a playbook dependent on perceived legitimacy. Russia, on the other hand, is not a peer competitor--or even a near-peer competitor--with the United States. In contrast to China, Russia seeks to level the playing field by disrupting and subverting the international order. Moreover, its strategy to alter the status quo is predicated not on legitimacy but on chaos. Given the vast capabilities that China and Russia deploy on a global scale, as well as several high-profile incidents of Chinese and Russian interference in the past several years, it is worth briefly exploring each regime's strategic intent, their general goals, some of the techniques they deploy in support of their goals, and the similarities and differences between them."
Publisher: Center for American Progress
Date: 2019-02-28
URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=822729
U.S.-Russia Engagement on the Ukraine Crisis: Is it Possible and Would it Matter?
"The Minsk Agreements (to be more specific, the 'Complex of Measures' document known as Minsk II) were concluded in the capital of Belarus on February 12, 2015. The key negotiators were the leaders of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine. Although the accord did lead to a significant drop in violence and bloodshed, almost none of its provisions have been implemented. Today, the process is stalled, low-level fighting is ongoing in eastern Ukraine, and significant escalation risks are ever-present. There are many explanations as to why this outcome has come to pass, many of which are biased and one-sided. Kyiv routinely blames the entire conflict on 'Russian aggression,' while the Kremlin argues that the Ukrainian side has never been truly committed to the Minsk Agreements--particularly, to the political clauses of the document--and that the West must force its hand."
Publisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)
Date: 2019-03
Series: Key Challenges in U.S.-Russian Relations
Japan-Russia Territorial Negotiations and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
"As negotiations between Japan and Russia over the status of the disputed Southern Kuril Islands have accelerated under Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's administration, Moscow has increasingly looked to connect the issue to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This is a longstanding tactic that Moscow has employed to encourage Japan to distance itself from its U.S. ally, and it has found renewed success in influencing Japan's foreign policy under Abe. Some may be tempted to intervene to remind Tokyo of where its priorities should lie, yet Washington should remain reticent since a heavy-handed intervention may be precisely what Moscow is hoping for. Abe's Russia policy may be naive and disconcerting to many in the West, yet it should be permitted to run its natural course."
Publisher: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Date: 2019-01?
URL: https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Japan-Russia-Territorial-Negotiations_Jan16.pdf
Collision Avoidance: Lessons from U.S. And Russian Operations in Syria
"This paper explores the evolution of the deconfliction effort over the past three years and why discussions about deeper U.S.-Russia military-to-military cooperation in Syria failed to produce meaningful results. It draws on interviews with current and former U.S. officials as well as open source material in English and Russian to answer three core questions: Is deconfliction a sufficient end in itself, given the levels of mistrust that are now pervasive on both sides? Were repeated high-level Russian expressions of interest in cooperation genuine or simply part of a cynical effort to buy time for military efforts to pay off? Was an opportunity missed to forge practical cooperation or did the wide disparity between U.S. and Russian strategic objectives make that impossible? A close examination of U.S.-Russian military-to-military ties in Syria also can help shed light on how political leaders and military professionals on both sides were able to maintain productive lines of communication and avoid dangerous situations in the wake of the dramatic breakdown in relations triggered by Russia's war in Ukraine."
Publisher: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Date: 2019-03
URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Weiss_Ng_U.S.-Russia_Syria-final1.pdf
United States and Russia in the Greater Middle East
"Though the Middle East has not been the trigger of the current U.S.-Russia crisis, it is an area of competition. The American and Russian militaries are pursuing different objectives and are in close proximity in Syria, with a risk of unintended incidents. The views of the United States and Russia on Iran and its role in regional affairs are significantly different. Moscow and Washington have disagreements on the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), sanctions against Iran, and the future of its nuclear program. They approach the Iranian political system and regime differently and have divergent attitudes toward Iran's role in Syria. These differences overlap with disagreement regarding the resolution of the Syrian conflict as well as other disputes in the Middle East. These tensions are further exacerbated by an unprecedented deterioration of the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship in general. Congress has imposed sanctions on Russia over Moscow's support for the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad and is likely to further increase pressure in the near future. Sanctions legally define Russia as a challenger and competitor of the United States. In other words, U.S.-Russia relations are in a negative path dependency which may perpetuate the logic of rivalry even if there are opportunities for cooperation. Still, U.S. and Russian interests in the Middle East and Afghanistan are not wholly incompatible. Despite the many disagreements, there is also space for common interests and joint action."
Publisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)
Date: 2019-03
Series: Key Challenges in U.S.-Russian Relations
RAND: Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (2016)
Beginning in summer 2014, RAND Arroyo Center conducted a series of wargames examining possible Russian conventional aggression against the three Baltic members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Although such an attack may not be likely, Moscow’s recent behavior suggests that NATO should take the prospect sufficiently seriously to at least evaluate the requirements for deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russian adventurism.
URL: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1002535.pdf
Russia: Defence & Security Report (2019) Includes 10-year forecasts to 2028
Russian demand for defence equipment will remain strong in the coming years: the military is undergoing extensive modernisation, and the country faces a broad range of security threats. Sluggish economic growth is bound to result in slower defence budget expansion and delays in some procurement programmes, but overall, the frequency of new acquisitions will remain relatively high. The vast majority of contracts will be awarded domestically, given Moscow's strong emphasis on defence sector development and self-sufficiency. Russian military manufacturers, while still lagging behind some Western counterparts, have strong design, development and production capabilities across most sector segments and will see exports continue to grow in the years ahead, as defence spending increases in many of its key export regions.
Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov's 2018 Presentation to the General Staff Academy: Thoughts on Future Military Conflict--March 2018.
Military Review. Jan/Feb2019, Vol. 99 Issue 1, p130-138. 9p.
The article focuses on 2018 Presentation of Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov to the General Staff Academy. Topics of the presentation include domestic and foreign experience of the employment of armed forces in military conflicts, role of radio-electronic warfare, information-technical effects, and information-psychological effects is expanding and war between (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO and Yugoslavia was proclaimed as a new-generation conflict.
The Russian Armed Forces in Syria: Assessing Russian Reforms, May 2018 (1:07:01) |
Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025, Jan 2018 (1:25:53) |
Russian Influence Activities in the Digital Space and Beyond June 2018 (1:23:24) |
The Russian Way of Warfare April 2018 (1:23:51) |